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EPIPEN, PATENTS, AND LIFE AND DEATH 
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Drug pricing disputes, while significant public health concerns, are not typically 
immediate life or death matters. But they may be for certain emergency medicines, 
medicines used for potentially lethal and rapidly onset illnesses or injuries. This is 
especially true for emergency drug-device combination products, like Mylan’s EpiPen, 
for which patients can bear a significant brunt of the products’ cost. Scholarly 
commentary on the controversy surrounding the pricing of Mylan’s EpiPen, however, 
has largely elided over this relationship among combination products, emergency 
medicine, and patient payment, often focusing instead on classic issues of antitrust and 
competition. This brief Essay explores how EpiPen’s pricing capacity is a function of a 
peculiar intersection of emergency medicine, FDA law and policy, and patents, and 
suggests areas of further analysis for other drug-device emergency combination 
products. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Drug-pricing disputes, while significant policy and public health concerns, do 
not typically present immediate life or death consequences. But drugs for emergency 
medicine—that is, drugs for “unforeseen illness or injury . . . requiring expeditious 
medical, surgical, or psychiatric care”1—may be exceptions.2 Because access to 
drugs often depends on competitive pricing, drug manufacturers’ control of pricing 
levers, such as patents, has the power to save—or threaten—the lives of patients in 
critical danger.3 This is exacerbated where patients need drug-device combination 
products for self-administration in extreme situations, as is the case for Mylan’s 
emergency epinephrine autoinjector, EpiPen.4 In the words of one pharmacist, the 
price of an EpiPen “could mean life or death.”5 
At the same time, EpiPen, specifically, has a complex legal and regulatory 
history that belies a simple connection between competitive pricing and access to 
emergency medicines. While scholarship and reporting have largely focused on the 
ways classically anticompetitive conduct has arguably enabled EpiPen’s pricing,6 it 
 
 1 DEFINITION OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE, AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS (2021), 
https://www.acep.org/patient-care/policy-statements/definition-of-emergency-medicine 
[https://perma.cc/QMB2-4RD4]. 
 2 Insulin may also be an example where drug pricing can lead to near immediate life-or-death 
consequences for patients. See generally S. Vincent Rajkumar, The High Cost of Insulin in the 
United States: An Urgent Call to Action, 95 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 22 (2020) (describing the reasons 
for, and risks of, the high cost of insulin in the United States); Colleen V. Chien, Cheap Drugs at 
What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 
18 BERK. TECH. L.J. 853, 888 (2003) (describing pricing controversies over insulin). Nonetheless, 
insulin may itself be a special case in that it is used both in a daily regime and as an emergency 
medicine. See generally Ziv Harel & Kamel S. Kamel, Optimal Dose and Method of Administration 
of Intravenous Insulin in the Management of Emergency Hyperkalemia: A Systematic Review, 
PLOS ONE, May 2016. 
 3 See Govind Persad, Examining Pharmaceutical Exceptionalism: Intellectual Property, 
Practical Expediency, and Global Health, 18 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 157, 159 (2019) 
(“Pharmaceutical exceptionalists regard IP rights in medicines as a major impediment to global 
health, and therefore argue for eliminating IP protections or imposing greater obligations on IP 
holders.”); Rebecca E. Wolitz, A Corporate Duty to Rescue: Biopharmaceutical Companies and 
Access to Medications, 94 IND. L.J. 1163, 1165 (2019) (noting the same for “life-saving 
medications”). 
 4 See, e.g., EPIPEN PRESCRIBING INFORMATION (Dec. 2020), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2020/019430s091lbl.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2TYM-8D5M] (describing the use of EpiPen in emergencies).  
 5 Cost of EpiPen Continues to Rise Putting Burden on People with Allergies, WKYT (Aug. 
17, 2016), https://www.wkyt.com/content/news/Cost-of-EpiPen-continues-to-rise--
390412751.html [https://perma.cc/D7H4-PQ36]. 
 6 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Mark A. Lemley & Shawn Miller, Playing Both Sides? 
Branded Sales, Generic Drugs, and Antitrust Policy, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 307 (2020); Ramsi A. 
Woodcock, The Antitrust Duty to Charge Low Prices, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1741 (2018); Michael 
A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, The Untold EpiPen Story: How Mylan Hiked Prices by Blocking 
Rivals, 102 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 53 (2017); Ed Silverman & Ike Swetlitz, Sanofi Sues Mylan 
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is also critical to consider how the intersection of patent and FDA law has given rise 
to EpiPen’s dominant market position. Although the EpiPen story is in many ways 
atypical, if not unique, understanding the connections among emergency medicine, 
the regulation of drug-device combination products, and patent protection may be 
instructive in assessing—and possibly preventing—pricing controversies for other 
emergency medicine products. 
This brief Essay examines these connections in the context of EpiPen and 
focuses, in particular, on the intellectual property and regulatory regimes that helped 
Mylan maintain high prices and depress competition for EpiPen. It concludes by 
highlighting several areas for policymakers and regulators to watch as drug-device 
emergency medicine combination products, and autoinjectors more generally, 
become increasingly popular.7 
I 
EPIPEN’S MARKET POSITION  
Certain emergency medicines, which lay people may need to administer during 
an emergency before trained medical personnel can arrive, come in pre-filled, self-
injectable syringes, also known as “autoinjectors.”8 This is true of Mylan’s EpiPen, 
which is a ready-to-use, pre-filled, self-administered syringe containing epinephrine, 
a drug that treats life-threatening allergic reactions.9 Children and adults with severe 
nut allergies, for example, often carry epinephrine autoinjectors to halt runaway 
allergic reactions in case they come into contact with the allergen.10 Upon 
experiencing the initial symptoms of anaphylactic shock—a life-threatening allergic 
reaction—the person would immediately use the preloaded autoinjector to inject 
themself with epinephrine.11 Modern epinephrine autoinjectors are critical for 
health—for example, one study of roughly six thousand schools found that eleven 
percent reported having one or more anaphylactic events during a single school 
 
Over Alleged Anti-Competitive Marketing of EpiPen, STAT NEWS (Apr. 24, 2017), 
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2017/04/24/sanofi-mylan-antitrust [https://perma.cc/6828-
NU7L]. 
 7 This would include drug-device combination products that allow layperson-administration 
of naloxone, a drug for reversing opioid overdose, and those products, similarly have been subject 
to pricing controversies. See, e.g., Ravi Gupta, Nilay D. Shah & Joseph S. Ross, The Rising Price 
of Naloxone—Risks to Efforts to Stem Overdose Deaths, 375 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 2213 (2016); see 
also Cindy H. Dubin, Injection Devices: Will COVID-19 Deliver Growth to the Market?, DRUG 
DEV. & DELIVERY, Sept. 2020, at 46 (describing increasing pharmaceutical industry interest in 
developing autoinjector products). 
 8 See Dubin, supra note 7, at 46. Drugs intended for chronic and other non-emergency 
conditions might also be sold as autoinjectors for various reasons. See id. 
 9 EPIPEN PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 4. 
 10 See Peanut Allergy, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/peanut-
allergy/symptoms-causes/syc-20376175 [https://perma.cc/3QKX-N98U] (last visited May 27, 
2021).  
 11 HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 4. 
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year.12 The benefits of epinephrine autoinjectors have recently led both states and 
the federal government to address their availability and use in schools.13 
But the concept of rapidly deploying epinephrine to treat anaphylaxis is not 
new. Indeed, EpiPen’s roots can be traced back to a roughly century-old drug, 
epinephrine,14 administered using a 360-year-old technology, the hypodermic 
needle.15 But EpiPen’s easy-to-use design and familiarity to consumers, combined 
with increased public awareness of severe allergic conditions, have allowed Mylan 
to recently—and rapidly—profit from this long-standing medical knowledge. After 
a wildly successful marketing and public awareness campaign, Mylan captured 95% 
of the epinephrine autoinjector market.16 For various reasons, patients often pay 
significant out-of-pocket costs for EpiPens,17 although Mylan offers rebates for 
some of these purchases.18 
EpiPen’s popularity has much to do with Mylan’s own efforts. Beginning with 
Heather Bresch’s tenure at Mylan, first as its Director of Government Relations and 
then as its CEO starting in 2012, the company has embarked on a wide-ranging 
public awareness campaign about anaphylaxis and EpiPens’ role in saving lives.19 
This has included pairing with celebrities, such as Sarah Jessica Parker (who later 
 
 12 Susan L. Hogue, Diana Goss, Kelly Hollis, Suyapa Silvia & Martha V. White, Training and 
Administration of Epinephrine Auto-Injectors for Anaphylaxis Treatment in US Schools: Results 
from the EpiPen4Schools® Pilot Survey, 9 J. ASTHMA & ALLERGY 109, 110 (2016). 
 13 42 U.S.C. § 280g(d); see also Ashley Noble, Increasing Access to Epinephrine, NAT’L CONF. 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (2016) (describing the state and federal laws). 
 14 See Walter Sneader, The Discovery and Synthesis of Epinephrine, 14 DRUG NEWS & PERSPS. 
491, 492 (2001). 
 15 See C. Ball, The Early Development of Intravenous Apparatus, 34 ANAESTHESIA & 
INTENSIVE CARE 22, 22 (2006) (dating the first modern intravenous needle to Christopher Wren’s 
experiments in 1656). 
 16 Jen Wieczner, Mylan CEO Blamed Obamacare for EpiPen Sticker Shock, FORTUNE (Aug. 
24, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/24/mylan-ceo-epipen-heather-bresch 
[https://perma.cc/784H-9TRZ]. 
 17 While epinephrine autoinjectors are covered by many health insurance programs, the timing 
and necessary quantity of such purchases may not be fully covered in all circumstances, thus 
requiring the patient to bear the brunt of any out-of-pocket costs. Cf. Michelle M. Mello, What 
Makes Ensuring Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs the Hardest Problem in Health Policy?, 
102 MINN. L. REV. 2273, 2275 (2018) (describing out-of-pocket costs for EpiPen and a competitor 
product, Auvi-Q). One of the authors (PJZ) also can attest to this from personal experience. 
 18 See Access and Savings Program, EPIPEN, https://www.epipen.com/paying-for-epipen-and-
generic [https://perma.cc/5N7B-APAG] (last visited May 27, 2021) (describing EpiPen’s savings 
programs); see also Mello, supra note 17, at 2275 (describing kaléo’s “zero-cost prescription” for 
its epinephrine autoinjector, Auvi-Q, and pharmaceutical companies’ financial incentives to offer 
such programs); Wolitz, supra note 3, at 1199–200 (explaining pharmaceutical companies’ 
financial incentives to offer patient assistance programs). 
 19 See Cynthia Koons & Robert Langreth, How Marketing Turned the EpiPen Into a Billion-
Dollar Business, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 23, 2015), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-23/how-marketing-turned-the-epipen-into-a-
billion-dollar-business [https://perma.cc/2RJE-Q7BD]. 
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withdrew from the relationship).20 Indeed, Mylan’s EpiPen has become such a 
cultural phenomenon that the term “EpiPen” is now often used to refer to 
epinephrine autoinjectors of all sorts, whether Mylan’s or one of its competitors.21 
Beyond this broad promotional campaign, Mylan also has used legal and 
regulatory mechanisms to apparently keep competitors at bay. One important 
example of these efforts is Mylan’s work to make EpiPen the exclusive supply of 
epinephrine autoinjectors in school infirmaries through its “EpiPen4Schools” 
program. A 2016 report from STAT News documented that the program offered 
increased rebates to schools that purchased EpiPens if they signed what was 
effectively an exclusive supply agreement.22 And Mylan offered state Medicaid 
programs larger rebates if they eased EpiPens’ prescription rules relative to 
competitors.23 As another example, Mylan engineered several patent litigation 
settlements with competitors that delayed market entry for competing products.24 
Taken together, such efforts yielded EpiPen a dominant—if potentially 
anticompetitive—market position.25 
From 2007 to 2016, to great controversy, Mylan capitalized on this market 
position by raising the wholesale price of an EpiPen autoinjector two-pack from 
around $100 to $600—a roughly 500% increase.26 Because of EpiPens’ potential to 
literally save lives—in particular, the lives of children—the price increase sparked 
public outrage, including complaints that Mylan engaged in “price gouging.”27 The 
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held a hearing on the 
matter and Bresch, herself, was called to testify.28 Bresch’s testimony did little to 
extinguish the public ire focused on Mylan, and the CEO was rebuked by 
 
 20 Rebecca Robbins, Sarah Jessica Parker Cuts Ties with Mylan in Anger over EpiPen Price 
Hikes, STAT NEWS (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/08/25/sarah-jessica-parker-
epipen [https://perma.cc/53FC-PRXK]. 
 21 See Mike Mireles, My My Mylan: The Trademark Silver Lining for Mylan’s EPIPEN, IPKAT 
(Sept. 2, 2016), https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2016/09/my-my-mylan-trademark-silver-lining-
for.html [https://perma.cc/KH3Q-RPTV] (discussing these issues in the trademark context). 
 22 See Ike Swetlitz & Ed Silverman, Mylan May Have Violated Antitrust Law in Its EpiPen 
Sales to Schools, Legal Experts Say, STAT NEWS (Aug. 25, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/2016/08/25/mylan-antitrust-epipen-schools [https://perma.cc/98YP-
89CU] (noting Mylan required schools to “not in the next twelve (12) months purchase any 
products that are competitive to EpiPen® Auto-Injectors”). 
 23 Ike Swetlitz, Mylan Offered EpiPen Discounts to States in Exchange for Privileged Status, 
Documents Show, STAT NEWS (June 22, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/06/22/mylan-
epipen-discount-medicaid-preferred [https://perma.cc/7YHT-DKC6].  
 24 Carrier & Minniti, supra note 6, at 59–64.  
 25 See id. at 59 (noting Mylan’s efforts make it difficult to compete and “effectively restrain 
EpiPen pricing”). 
 26 See Mello, supra note 17, at 2274. 
 27 Editorial, The EpiPen Outrage Continues, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/opinion/the-epipen-outrage-continues.html 
[https://perma.cc/7CKJ-SKMJ]. 
 28 See, e.g., Mello, supra note 17, at 2275. 
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shareholders in a compensation vote the following year.29 
Mylan has since attempted to quell the controversy by offering its own 
authorized generic version of EpiPen—at $300 a two-pack.30 It has not, however, 
significantly lowered prices for its branded product, and—even with the entry of a 
generic EpiPen (Teva) and the re-entry of kaléo’s Auvi-Q epinephrine 
autoinjector—has nonetheless retained its dominant position in the marketplace.31 
Another epinephrine autoinjector, Impax’s Adrenaclick, is different enough—in 
design at least—to make it a less desirable alternative for many patients.32 Jonathan 
D. Alpern and William M. Stauffer have complained that “[w]ithout [yet] other 
competitors, history tells us not to expect significant cost savings anytime soon for 
this much-needed medicine.”33 
Much of the commentary on the persistently high price of EpiPen, specifically, 
has considered Mylan’s conduct through the lens of antitrust law.34 Michael A. 
Carrier and Carl J. Minniti III, for example, examined three facets of Mylan’s 
conduct—Mylan’s predecessor’s settlement with Teva, its citizen petitions to the 
FDA about competing products, and its exclusive supply agreements with schools 
and Medicaid programs—as possible antitrust violations.35 This “full range of 
 
 29 See Ed Silverman, Mylan Board Survives Ouster Attempt, but Shareholders Reject Rich Pay 
Packages, STAT NEWS (June 22, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2017/06/22/mylan-
board-vote [https://perma.cc/DMX9-NMGA] (discussing shareholders’ displeasure with the 
negative perception surrounding the company). 
 30 The term “authorized generic” refers to a drug that is the same as the approved brand name 
drug, but “that is marketed without the brand name on its label.” FDA List of Authorized Generic 
Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/abbreviated-new-drug-
application-anda/fda-list-authorized-generic-drugs [https://perma.cc/7H3X-VA4K] (last updated 
Apr. 1, 2021). 
 31 See Letter from Vincent Sansone, Deputy Dir., Off. of Regul. Operations, U.S. Food & Drug 
Admin., to Cory Wohlbach, Senior Dir., U.S. Generics Regul. Affs., Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. (Aug. 
16, 2018), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2018/090589Orig1s000ltr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2XFM-BJNU] (approving the ANDA for Teva’s generic EpiPen); Matthew 
Herper, EpiPen Competitor Auvi-Q to Return to Market, Promising Lower Costs for Patients, 
FORBES (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2016/10/26/epipen-
competitor-auvi-q-to-return-to-market-promising-lower-costs-for-patients/?sh=14d0502576df 
[https://perma.cc/72NK-D5EF] (describing kaléo’s plans for beginning to market Auvi-Q again in 
2017). 
 32 See W. Nicholson Price II, The Cost of Novelty, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 769, 807 (2020) (“The 
Adrenaclick, the closest competitor [to the EpiPen], is just a little bit different than the EpiPen . . . . 
The differences are minor, and certainly not improvements; it is hard to see a reason for them 
besides avoiding the EpiPen patents, especially since the Adrenaclick was developed well after the 
EpiPen.”). 
 33 Jonathan D. Alpern & William M. Stauffer, Does a Generic EpiPen Mean Lower Prices? 
Don’t Hold Your Breath, STAT NEWS (Sept. 7, 2018), 
https://www.statnews.com/2018/09/07/generic-epipen-teva-lower-prices [https://perma.cc/PT5C-
34WN]. 
 34 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 6. 
 35 Carrier & Minniti, supra note 6, at 53. 
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behavior,” concluded Carrier and Minniti, “raises significant antitrust concerns and 
deserves a thorough investigation.”36 Others have considered a wide range of causes 
of, and issues associated with, high prescription drug prices in general, including the 
industry’s moral obligations and the role of state law.37 
But Mylan’s power to make its own market can also be understood as arising 
from a synergistic intersection of patents, FDA law and policy, and the emergency 
context in which EpiPens are used. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, EpiPen is a “combination product,” i.e., “[a] product comprised of two or more 
regulated components, [e.g.,] drug/device.”38 This status has enabled Mylan to add 
patents covering the device component of EpiPen (and its improvements) to the 
“Orange Book”—a list of FDA-approved drugs and their attendant patents and 
regulatory exclusivities. This is important because the Orange Book plays a 
significant role in determining when generic competition can enter the market.39 The 
ability to list device patents in the Orange Book, thus, gives Mylan an advantage 
compared to manufacturers of simple drug products because the FDA otherwise 
prohibits adding to the Orange Book a variety of patents untethered to the drug’s 
 
 36 Id. at 72. 
 37 See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Why Are We Being Overcharged for 
Pharmaceuticals? What Should We Do About It?, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 137, 137–38 (2019) 
(discussing the role of price indices for high drug prices); Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michael S. Sinha, 
Jerry Avorn & Ameet Sarpatwari, Pharmaceutical Policy in the United States in 2019: An 
Overview of the Landscape and Avenues for Improvement, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 421, 453 
(2019) (discussing numerous issues relating to high drug prices); see also Rachel E. Sachs, 
Administering Health Innovation, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2018) (describing drug pricing 
as one health technology policy problem for which the relationships between agencies are 
important); see generally Isaac D. Buck, The Drug (Pricing) Wars: States, Preemption, and 
Unsustainable Prices, 99 N.C. L. REV. 167 (2020) (discussing the intersection of high drug prices 
and vertical federalism); Michelle M. Mello & Rebecca E. Wolitz, Legal Strategies for Reining in 
“Unconscionable” Prices for Prescription Drugs, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 859 (2020) (discussing 
numerous issues relating to high drug prices); Govind Persad, Pricing Drugs Fairly, 62 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 929 (2021) (same); Persad, supra note 3 (examining companies’ moral duties to 
patients in need of their products); Wolitz, supra note 3 (discussing the absence of legal duties 
related to companies’ commanding high drug prices). 
 38 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(e)(1) (2020); see also 21 U.S.C. § 353(g) (describing combination products 
and explaining the FDA’s regulatory scheme for such products). 
 39 See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ORANGE BOOK QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: DRAFT GUIDANCE (May 2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/138389/download [https://perma.cc/9BHA-LJFW]. For example, if a 
company would like to market its generic product before all patents listed in the Orange Book for 
the branded product have expired, it files what is known as a “Paragraph IV certification.” Id. at 
10–11. As Dmitry Karshtedt has explained, “[t]he filing of a Paragraph IV certification is deemed 
by statute to be an act of patent infringement that allows the parties to initiate a lawsuit . . . which 
in turn triggers an automatic 30-month stay against [the FDA’s] approval of the [generic drug].” 
Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents, Drug Modifications, and the 
FDA, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1129, 1149 (2019). For further discussion of the Orange Book’s role as a 
“critical link between patent and FDA-regulatory aspects of pharmaceuticals” that helps determine 
when generic competition reaches the market, see id. at 1148–49. 
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pharmaceutical composition.40 That is, this allows Mylan to use patents that would 
not otherwise be available to block generic competition for EpiPen. Furthermore, in 
the context of a product intended for emergencies for which people often incur 
significant out-of-pocket costs, this wrinkle has been one key to Mylan’s power over 
the epinephrine autoinjectable market. 
II 
EPIPEN’S PATENTS AND GENERIC COMPETITION 
One reason Mylan retains a dominant market position for epinephrine 
autoinjectors is that, unlike some drugs involved in recent pricing controversies,41 
Mylan’s EpiPen is not a generic product; it is a branded drug still protected by its 
own patents. This may be surprising given that basic syringes are centuries old and 
epinephrine has been used for over 100 years.42 But the key differences between 
EpiPen and what came before it are the specifics of the product’s design: the quantity 
and stability of epinephrine in the syringe, the length of the needle, the physical 
stability of the device’s safety release, the ease and time for self-injection, and the 
dispersion and uptake of epinephrine in the body.43 These design elements allow 
EpiPens to be safely used by anyone, even those without specialized medical 
training, in tense, life-threatening emergencies.44 
The functional design elements of the autoinjector, rather than the drug itself, 
give patent protection to EpiPen. While EpiPen’s original design stems from a 1977 
patent from one of Mylan’s predecessors, Meridian Medical Technologies, the 
design has been reworked over the years in response to safety concerns, like 
accidental autoinjection.45 On these improvements, Meridian received at least five 
patents, all expiring on September 11, 2025.46 One was listed in the Orange Book 
 
 40 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2020).  
 41 See, e.g., Chintan V. Dave, Aaron S. Kesselheim, Erin R. Fox, Peihua Qiu & Abraham 
Hartzema, High Generic Drug Prices and Market Competition: A Retrospective Cohort Study, 167 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 145, 145 (2017) (noting recent pricing controversies involving 
companies like Turing and Valeant).  
 42 See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 43 See Robert L. Hill, John G. Wilmot, Beth A. Belluscio, Kevin Cleary, David Lindisch, Robin 
Tucker, Emmanuel Wilson & Rajesh B. Shukla, Comparison of Drug Delivery with Autoinjector 
Versus Manual Prefilled Syringe and Between Three Different Autoinjector Devices Administered 
in Pig Thigh, 9 MED. DEVICES: EVIDENCE & RSCH. 257, 257 (2016); Andreas Schwirtz & Harald 
Seeger, Comparison of the Robustness and Functionality of Three Adrenaline Auto-Injectors, 5 J. 
ASTHMA & ALLERGY 39, 45 (2012) (noting advantages of cartridge-based designs—including 
EpiPen’s—over syringe-based designs).  
 44 Schwirtz & Seeger, supra note 43, at 43.  
 45 See Narayan Deshmukh & J. Timothy Tolland, Treatment of Accidental Epinephrine 
Injection in a Finger, 7 J. EMERGENCY MED. 408, 408 (1989) (documenting a school nurse’s 
accidental injection). 
 46 Patent and Exclusivity for: N019430, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/patent_info.cfm?Product_No=001&Appl_No=01
9430&Appl_type=N [https://perma.cc/D9UU-NCP6] (last visited June 10, 2021). 
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by Mylan as recently as 2017, at perhaps the height of EpiPen’s pricing 
controversy.47  
Alongside Mylan’s government outreach, consumer awareness of the product, 
and EpiPens’ safety profile, these patents have significantly suppressed competition. 
Generally, drug manufacturers who wish to create a generic version of a patented 
drug must first challenge the drug’s Orange Book-listed patents in court.48 This is a 
time-consuming, laborious, and, above all, costly process. A 2019 report by the 
American Intellectual Property Law Association pegged a typical pharmaceutical 
lawsuit as costing each side approximately $7 million in attorneys’ fees alone.49 
Nonetheless, several companies did indeed challenge Mylan’s new EpiPen patents, 
notably Teva Pharmaceuticals in 2009.50 After three years of litigation, Mylan and 
Teva settled their patent dispute in 2012, with the agreement that Teva would be 
able to sell a true generic EpiPen by mid-2015.51 But difficulties with the FDA’s 
approval process—according to Mylan, Teva’s autoinjector was slightly different 
and less safe—prevented Teva from coming to market until 2018.52 Other 
companies, like Sanofi, have attempted to circumvent Mylan’s patents by using 
different forms of the autoinjector.53 But safety concerns for those products, too, 
have slowed their widespread adoption.54 In Sanofi’s case, its epinephrine 
autoinjector product, Auvi-Q, was voluntarily recalled by the company in 201555 
and not reintroduced until 2017 (after Sanofi returned marketing rights to kaléo).56 
In some ways, this is unsurprising. Part of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s “delicate” 
compromise between innovation and competition centers on patents as the principal 
instruments keeping generics at bay.57 Broadly speaking, the FDA cannot approve a 
 
 47 See id. (listing U.S. Patent No. 9,586,010 on May 12, 2017). 
 48 See Jacob S. Sherkow, Administrating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 205, 214–15 
(2015) (noting that FDA approval of generic versions of patented drugs requires a final resolution 
of the patent dispute). 
 49 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, 2019 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 50–71 (2019), 
https://www.aipla.org/detail/journal-issue/2019-report-of-the-economic-survey. 
 50 Carrier & Minniti, supra note 6, at 59–64. 
 51 Id. at 60. 
 52 See id. at 64–66; Michael Erman & Jillian Mincer, Exclusive: Teva’s Generic EpiPen Launch 
Stalls Months After Approval, REUTERS (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-teva-
pharm-ind-epipen-exclusive/exclusive-tevas-generic-epipen-launch-stalls-months-after-approval-
idUSKCN1PP2BU [https://perma.cc/QL4N-3AWW]. 
 53 See Meghana Keshavan, 5 Reasons Why No One Has Built a Better EpiPen, STAT NEWS 
(Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/09/09/epipen-lack-of-innovation/ 
[https://perma.cc/U7W4-CXTL] (describing Auvi-Q). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Auvi-Q Epinephrine Auto-Injector Returns, 59 MED. LETTER ON DRUGS & THERAPEUTICS 
33, 33 (2017). 
 56 Id. 
 57 See Erika Lietzan, The History and Political Economy of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, 
49 SETON HALL L. REV. 53, 100, 102, 105 (2018) (describing but rejecting the common perception 
that the Hatch-Waxman Act was struck as a compromise during the legislative process). 
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generic version of a drug until the patents listed in the Orange Book covering the 
branded drug expire or are shown to be invalid or not infringed.58 Such patents—at 
least, as traditionally contemplated—typically cover the active ingredient and its 
pharmaceutical composition, e.g., the drug and its tablet (or other dosage form), in 
addition to its methods of use.59 Indeed, to limit the patents that drug developers can 
assert against generics, the FDA refuses to include in the Orange Book a variety of 
patents covering aspects of the product other than the medicament itself.60 Once the 
principal patents covering the product and its use expire, variations on other 
components of the product, such as the processes for making it or the drug’s 
packaging, should not be arbiters of generic competition.61 
Yet EpiPen’s patent protection on the autoinjector—rather than the solution 
inside of it—is atypical,62 and gives rise to particular inefficiencies under the Hatch-
Waxman Act. Given the importance of the autoinjector itself to emergency 
epinephrine products—as demonstrated by Teva and Sanofi’s difficulties in 
manufacturing a suitable autoinjector—patents covering EpiPen’s device and its 
safety enhancements have the power to stymie generic competition, long after either 
the drug or the device were first used.63 Small changes, like the cover of the needle, 
can thwart generic entry.64 While this may seem like an opportunity to design around 
these changes to avoid infringement, modifications to the autoinjector may make the 
product less safe—as was the case with Sanofi’s difficulties producing Auvi-Q.65 In 
addition, and for EpiPen specifically, consumers’ familiarity with EpiPen’s precise 
functionality may discourage them from trying noninfringing variants of the 
product—such as Adrenaclick—even if those have been demonstrated to be safe.66 
 
 58 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3); see also Karshtedt, supra note 39, at 1149–50 (describing the process 
for and stakes of challenging patents listed in the Orange Book). 
 59 See Sherkow, supra note 48, at 233–34 (describing the phenomenon of “product hopping,” 
where manufacturers make minimal changes to patented drugs to prevent competition from generic 
products). 
 60 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2020) (“Process patents, patents claiming packaging, patents 
claiming metabolites, and patents claiming intermediates are not covered by this section, and 
information on these patents must not be submitted to FDA.”). 
 61 See Sherkow, supra note 48, at 252–53 (describing the role that refusing to list patents under 
21 C.F.R. § 314.53 plays in approving generic applications). 
 62 Cf. Listing of Patent Information in the Orange Book, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,169, 33,172 (June 1, 
2020) (acknowledging “uncertainty” about whether certain “device-related patents” may be 
submitted to the Orange Book). 
 63 See Carrier & Minniti, supra note 6, at 59–64 (arguing that Mylan has used these patents to 
block generic competition). 
 64 See Automatic Injector with Needle Cover, U.S. Patent No. 9,586,010, at [57] (filed Mar. 7, 
2013) (issued Mar. 7, 2017) (describing an autoinjector with a novel “needle cover operative to 
engage an injection site and activate the injector”). 
 65 See Auvi-Q Epinephrine Auto-Injector Returns, supra note 55, at 33 (noting previous safety 
concerns). 
 66 See Price, supra note 32, at 808 (“Although the differences between the EpiPen, Adrenaclick, 
and Auvi-Q are not especially large, they matter a great deal to patients—especially children—who 
use them in high-stress emergency situations.”). 
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With self-administered emergency medicines, which require trust and familiarity for 
their safe and effective use, and where seconds can be the difference between life 
and death, no one wants to stop to consult a manual.67 In this sense, patents covering 
the autoinjection device protect an aspect of real-world drug safety for which people 
may not have an unfettered choice. However, what allows such patents to be listed 
in the Orange Book in the first instance is a function of FDA law and policy. 
III 
DRUG-DEVICE COMBINATION PRODUCTS AND THE FDA’S ROLE 
Although the FDA does not have the authority to directly regulate drug prices, 
the FDA’s regulatory scheme can play a role in drug pricing, as demonstrated in the 
EpiPen pricing controversy. Perhaps the most well-known aspect of the FDA’s 
regulatory regime is its gatekeeping role for medical products—new drugs, and 
many devices, cannot be marketed in the United States before the manufacturer 
demonstrates to the FDA that the products are safe and effective for their intended 
use.68 This requirement may slow the entry of competing products to the market 
even when patents and regulatory exclusivity do not limit competition, as shown by 
the experiences of Teva and Sanofi with their epinephrine autoinjectors, but 
rightfully so. Patients and the public health are not served by access to ineffective or 
unsafe medical products, and it takes time to do the research necessary to develop 
sufficient information about product safety and effectiveness.69 
EpiPen and other autoinjectors, as explained above, are neither solely drugs 
nor solely devices. Instead, under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, they 
are “combination products” because they comprise both a drug (epinephrine) and a 
device (the autoinjector).70 When faced with a combination product, the FDA must 
determine the “primary mode of action”71—that which “provides the most important 
 
 67 See id. 
 68 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (d) (setting forth the new drug approval requirement and the 
standard for such approval). 
 69 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEMORANDUM: PUBLIC HEALTH INTERESTS AND FIRST 
AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO MANUFACTURER COMMUNICATIONS REGARDING 
UNAPPROVED USES OF APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL PRODUCTS 4−5 (2017), https:// 
downloads.regulations.gov/FDA-2016-N-1149-0040/attachment_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7S8E-
JCYP]; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 348 (2007) (“Although premarket approval is understood 
primarily as a consumer protection measure, in the past twenty years Congress has repeatedly fine-
tuned the FDA’s mandate as a market gatekeeper in ways that might be better understood in terms 
of innovation policy . . . .”). 
  Ineffective medicines may further put significant strain on the public fisc. See, e.g., Nicholas 
Bagley & Rachel Sachs, The Drug That Could Break American Health Care, ATLANTIC (June 11, 
2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/06/aduhelm-drug-alzheimers-cost-
medicare/619169 [https://perma.cc/R879-K69H] (describing how the approval of aducanumab for 
Alzheimer’s disease “could trigger hundreds of billions of dollars of new government spending”). 
 70 21 U.S.C. § 353(g). 
 71 Id. 
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therapeutic action”72—and regulate the product according to that mode of action. 
Generally, prefilled syringes and delivery systems are regulated as drugs because 
the device’s purpose is only to deliver the drug, which is the component that 
produces the desired effect or treats the disease or condition.73 EpiPen’s 
classification as a combination product that is regulated as a drug, therefore, is not a 
result of any particular action or strategy by Mylan but instead a result of federal 
law, FDA regulations, and longstanding FDA policy. 
But it is this regulatory structure that has empowered Mylan’s patent strategy. 
The classification of EpiPen, even partially, as a drug brings Mylan’s device into the 
Hatch-Waxman Act regime, allowing Mylan to list any patents not otherwise 
prohibited by the FDA in the Orange Book.74 Typically, the FDA does not refuse to 
authorize medical devices because of latent patent issues between competitors,75 
while classification as a drug requires the FDA to delay approval of generics until 
patent infringement issues have been resolved.76 When it comes to the EpiPen, by 
contrast, patents covering the device have hampered the FDA from approving 
generic products.77 
To be sure, this regulatory structure has its merits. The FDA has acknowledged 
that combination products can be more challenging to develop than traditional 
products.78 Accordingly, robust incentives to develop such products, like patents, 
may be useful. Additionally, some have argued that the approval standard for drugs 
is stricter than for devices,79 and so, by extension, approval for drug-device 
combination products, under new drug applications, should be stricter than for 
devices alone. And, in contrast to medical devices, which operate under an entirely 
 
 72 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(m) (2020). 
 73 Carl C. Peck & James S. Benson, Intercenter Agreement Between the Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research and the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, FDA (Oct. 31, 
1991), https://www.fda.gov/CombinationProducts/JurisdictionalInformation/ucm121177.htm 
[https://perma.cc/BLE8-VXF4] (describing the regulatory scheme for such “prefilled delivery 
system[s]”). 
 74 See Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676, 36,680 
(June 18, 2003) (“[I]f the patent claims the drug product . . . the patent must be submitted for 
listing.”). 
 75 See, e.g., Patricia J. Zettler & Erika Lietzan, Regulating Medical Devices in the United States, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE HEALTH LAW 758–63, 770–71 (David Orentlicher 
& Tamara K. Hervey eds., 2020) (describing the premarket authorization pathways for devices as 
well as the role of patents in device innovation). 
 76 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(vii). 
 77 See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text. 
 78 See, e.g., Reviewing the Rising Price of EpiPens: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight 
& Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 10 (2017) (statement of Douglas C. Throckmorton, Deputy Dir. for 
Regul. Programs, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.) (“FDA understands that development of combination 
products can be more challenging than for typical drug products.”). 
 79 E.g., Peter Barton Hutt, Richard A. Merrill & Alan M. Kirschenbaum, The Standard of 
Evidence Required for Premarket Approval Under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 47 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 605, 605–06 (1992). 
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different patent and approval regime,80 situating drug-device combination products 
within the Hatch-Waxman Act at least gives potential competitors notice of which 
patents they may be sued on.81 The FDA’s combination-product regulatory structure 
may therefore optimally align Mylan’s and the public’s interests regarding 
innovation, safety, and effectiveness. Unlike the vast majority of garden-variety 
generic drugs, safety and manufacturing issues did, indeed, affect EpiPen’s generic 
competitors;82 making ready-to-use, shelf-stable autoinjectors is hard.83 
And yet, EpiPen’s immediate life-or-death importance and the access problems 
that people have faced due to pricing evoke salient questions about whether the 
current regulatory structure is, in fact, the optimal one. To start, the FDA may want 
to revisit listing device patents on drug-device combination products approved under 
new drug applications in the Orange Book. The FDA has long claimed its authority 
to police the Orange Book is “purely ministerial.”84 And while that may be how the 
Agency sees its role,85 it is also the case that the FDA already bans listing various 
patents unrelated to the drug product in the Orange Book.86 It seemingly could do 
the same for device patents on drug-device combination products. Indeed, the 
Agency has itself signaled possible interest in changing its current approach: In June 
2020 it published a Notice in the Federal Register seeking public comment on the 
listing of patents covering device components of drug-device combination products, 
among other Orange Book issues.87  
 
 80 See generally Adam Lewin, Medical Device Innovation in America: Tensions Between Food 
and Drug Law and Patent Law, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 403, 415–27 (2012) (describing patents’ 
role in medical device approval). 
 81 Cf. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., Comment on Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations (the “Orange Book”) and Listing of Patent Information in the Orange 
Book 6 (Aug. 31, 2020), https://downloads.regulations.gov/FDA-2020-N-1127-
0010/attachment_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YK3S-KNFS] (commenting, in response to FDA’s 
Notice, “Teva generally believes that all patents which claim an integrated device component of an 
approved NDA product (or a method of using such an integrated device component) and which 
have the potential to block the marketing of an approved follow-on product should be listed in the 
Orange Book”). 
 82 See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 83 Keshavan, supra note 53. 
 84 See, e.g., aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2002) (“The FDA defends 
this purely ministerial conception of its role in the Orange Book listing process by explaining that 
it lacks both the resources and the expertise to police the correctness of Orange Book listings.”). 
 85 See, e.g., id. at 230 (affirming that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act “assigns the 
FDA a purely ministerial role regarding Orange Book listings”). 
 86 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2020). 
 87 85 Fed. Reg. 33,169, 33,173 (June 1, 2020); see also Mylan, Comment on Listing of Patent 
Information in the Orange Book, at 4–6 (Aug. 31, 2020), https://downloads.regulations.gov/FDA-
2020-N-1127-0018/attachment_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER9Z-PM2P] (“The FDA should accept 
device patents for listing in the Orange Book, but only if the device constituent part of a drug 
product claimed in the patent is integral to the drug’s delivery system and is reviewed and approved 
as part of the NDA.”); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., supra note 81, at 6 (“Teva generally believes that 
all patents . . . which have the potential to block the marketing of an approved follow-on product 
should be listed in the Orange Book.”). 
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If patents covering device components were no longer listed, whatever device-
related patent infringement issues exist between a brand combination product and 
possible generics could simply be litigated post-approval, against the backdrop of 
whatever price pressures such litigation yields.88 This would give the public access 
to the generic product while the surrounding patent litigation takes its course. To be 
fair, such litigation may yield arguably anticompetitive settlements, as described by 
Carrier and Minniti,89 no different from those that arose concerning EpiPen. But 
even then, such settlements would not be predicated on FDA approval, as they are 
now. This removes a rather heavy cudgel from brand manufacturers’ armory for 
keeping competition—and importantly, price competition—at bay. Although 
changing how and whether device patents are listed in the Orange Book is not a 
comprehensive solution to the kinds of pricing concerns highlighted by the EpiPen 
controversy, it is one action that one agency could take under existing law that might 
help. As Michelle M. Mello and Trish Riley explained, “the battle against drug 
overpricing is more likely to be fought with a thousand arrows than [one] silver 
bullet.”90 
Beyond these kinds of tweaks, however, it may be worth considering more 
radical changes to the FDA’s approach in specific contexts like that of EpiPen, i.e., 
emergency medicines intended for lay administration. To be clear, drug pricing for 
such medicines is an immediate—and urgent—public health concern that presents 
complicated issues ideally addressed through numerous reforms, many of which are, 
frankly, beyond the scope of the FDA’s current authority and expertise.91 But, in the 
absence of such reforms and assuming political appetite for changing the FDA’s 
authority to tackle these issues more directly, one possibility may be for the FDA, 
in certain circumstances, to clearly acknowledge the relationship between price, 
patient access, and health risks, and to consider that relationship in making its 
regulatory decisions.92 But again, this would likely be only a single bullet—and not 
 
 88 This occurs in other biopharmaceutical contexts; for example, patent suits between marketers 
of two independently approved (i.e., non-generic) drugs or biologics. Amgen’s biologic, Repatha, 
and Sanofi’s biologic, Praluent, both target the same molecule, PCSK9, and were separately 
approved for virtually identical indications; a post-approval patent suit between the two companies 
led to the lowering of prices for each. Ned Pagliarulo, Amgen Patents on Repatha Invalid, Judge 
Rules in Reversal, BIOPHARMA DIVE (Aug. 28, 2019), 
https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/amgen-patents-on-repatha-invalid-judge-rules-in-
reversal/561882 [https://perma.cc/ZY3M-6TLW]. 
 89 See Carrier & Minniti, supra note 6, at 62–63. 
 90 Michelle M. Mello & Trish Riley, To Address Drug Affordability, Grab the Low-Hanging 
Fruit, JAMA HEALTH F., at 2 (Feb. 25, 2021), https://jamanetwork.com/channels/health-
forum/fullarticle/2777036 [https://perma.cc/SYP9-UT7V]. 
 91 See, e.g., id.; Aaron S. Kesselheim, Jerry Avorn & Ameet Sarpatwari, The High Cost of 
Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 862 
(2016). 
 92 Cf. Craig J. Konnoth, Drugs’ Other Side-Effects, 105 IOWA L. REV. 171, 236 (2019) (arguing 
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a silver one—in a larger battle concerning drug pricing and emergency medicines.93 
Were the FDA to engage in such an analysis, it could begin by acknowledging 
that lower-quality emergency autoinjectors are more likely to cause grave harm. But 
this potential for harm perhaps should be balanced against the contextual risk under 
which these products are used. Emergency medicines are, by definition, those used 
in life-or-death situations—and yes, quality differences among emergency 
medicines may mean the difference between life or death. A person’s means should 
not dictate the care they receive.94 But this is complicated where—as with EpiPen—
price is, in fact, a major determinant of access, and it may be that small differences 
in the benefit-risk profiles of epinephrine autoinjectors would be acceptable to 
people given this reality. In those circumstances, for at least some patients, the 
comparison may not be between an optimal, but expensive, product and a cheaper 
one associated with more uncertainty—it may be between EpiPen or nothing at all. 
Indeed, following EpiPen’s pricing controversy, people described hoarding EpiPens, 
keeping them after they had expired due to the product’s high price, and forgoing 
purchases altogether.95  
As currently structured, price is not explicitly a factor in the FDA’s benefit-
risk analysis for approval.96 Congress seemingly structured the FDA’s approval 
authority with the presumption that patients will have access to the drug once 
approved, describing safety and effectiveness without express reference to price.97 
 
that FDA should take a broader perspective on what counts as relevant information about risks and 
benefits of drugs, noting that “[w]hile the FDA might run into political roadblocks if it refused to 
approve an application solely because of projected price, having the information would allow it to 
begin discussions with stakeholders about how to limit the public health effects of drug prices if 
the drug were approved”); Patricia J. Zettler, Margaret Foster Riley & Aaron S. Kesselheim, 
Implementing a Public Health Perspective in FDA Drug Regulation, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 221, 
223–24 (2018) (arguing that FDA should incorporate broader public health information into 
approval decisions for certain drug classes). Such a relationship is all the more important where a 
largely ineffective medicine financially threatens public payers. See Bagley & Sachs, supra note 
69. 
 93 See Mello & Riley, supra note 90, at 2 (“[I]n the US, the battle against drug overpricing is 
more likely to be fought with a thousand arrows than 1 silver bullet.”). 
 94 Cf. Persad, supra note 37, at 936–37, 942 (explaining “conceptions of fairness in drug 
pricing”). 
 95 Ike Swetlitz, High Price of EpiPens Spurs Consumers, EMTs to Resort to Syringes for 
Allergic Reactions, STAT NEWS (July 6, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/07/06/epipen-
prices-allergies [https://perma.cc/7AJJ-QQFT]. Still others have advocated that patients make their 
own epinephrine autoinjectors. See Patricia J. Zettler, Christi J. Guerrini & Jacob S. Sherkow, 
Finding a Regulatory Balance for Genetic Biohacking, in CONSUMER GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES: 
ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS (I. Glenn Cohen, Nita Farahany, Henry T. Greely & 
Carmel Shachar eds., forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 4) (on file with the New York University 
Law Review), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3490006. 
 96 See, e.g., Konnoth, supra note 92, at 236 (considering whether price should be a factor in the 
approval process); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(d), (j) (providing the statutory criteria for approval of 
new drug applications and abbreviated new drug applications). 
 97 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d), (j). 
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But with respect to emergency medicines with significant costs, such as EpiPen, 
price may be an element of whether or not patients use the drug at all. This is 
arguably analogous to a drug’s pharmaceutical tolerability or its method of 
administration, which the Agency does consider.98 
Moreover, there is at least one instance in which the Agency has appeared to 
consider the relationship between price and patient access, though not in the context 
of an approval decision. After the 2011 approval of the drug Makena for preterm 
labor—a branded version of a drug that had been sold at low cost for over fifty years 
through compounding pharmacies—the manufacturer set the price at $1,500 per 
dose.99 As with EpiPen, this price sparked outrage and Congressional hearings.100 
The FDA ultimately took the unusual step of announcing that it would not take 
enforcement action against compounding pharmacies that continued to make and 
sell the drug—thereby allowing patients to access cheaper,101 albeit illegal, 
unapproved versions of the drug manufactured with fewer safeguards.102 
To be clear, this is not to say the statutory standards of safety and effectiveness 
should not apply to epinephrine autoinjectors. FDA oversight and approval are 
crucially important for public health. Flooding the market with poor emergency 
medicines is liable to harm people who otherwise rely on the Agency’s oversight, 
cause the public to lose trust in the FDA and pharmaceuticals more broadly, and 
diminish the essential information-production value that FDA gatekeeping serves.103 
Allowing unfettered competition from less-regulated products also may have 
unintended consequences, such as undermining companies’ ability to meet higher 
standards and continue to be financially viable—for example, Makena’s 
manufacturer filed for bankruptcy in the wake of the FDA’s decision not to enforce 
against entities compounding versions of the drug.104 Moreover, measuring any 
 
 98 See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE: PATIENT-FOCUSED DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT: METHODS TO IDENTIFY WHAT IS IMPORTANT TO PATIENTS 35, 45 (2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/131230/download [https://perma.cc/2XCG-GHPX] (describing 
helpful methods to obtain patient feedback on “tolerability” and “[t]reatment burden,” the latter of 
which includes method of administration). 
 99 Erika Lietzan, Access Before Evidence and the Price of the FDA’s New Drug Authorities, 53 
U. RICH. L. REV. 1243, 1277 (2019). More specifically, Makena is a branded version of 
hydroxyprogesterone caproate, which had been marketed since before Congress created the modern 
drug approval process in 1962. At the time of Makena’s approval, hydroxyprogesterone caproate 
was widely available at a cost of $10 to $20 per dose through compounding pharmacies. Id. at 
1276–77. 
 100 Id. at 1277–78. 
 101 Id. at 1278; Rachel E. Sachs & Carolyn A. Edelstein, Ensuring the Safe and Effective FDA 
Regulation of Fecal Microbiota Transplantation, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 396, 404–05 (2015). 
 102 Cf. Kevin Outterson, Regulating Compounding Pharmacies After NECC, 367 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1969, 1969, 1971 (2012) (describing a contemporaneous fungal meningitis outbreak 
associated with compounded drugs that killed dozens of people). 
 103 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 347–48 (describing the information-generating value 
of the FDA approval process). 
 104 Lietzan, supra note 99, at 1278. 
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tradeoff in price and access versus changes to the product’s benefit-risk profile is 
likely to be practically difficult—and we do not attempt to do so here. And 
transparently including such a tradeoff in its assessment of a drug-device 
combination product, for the purpose of approval, would be a radical departure from 
the FDA’s general practice, likely posing legal and political risks for the Agency. 
But, within the context of drug-device combination products like EpiPen for which 
price can have immediate life-or-death consequences, it is worth lawmakers and the 
Agency at least considering some bold measures.  
CONCLUSION 
Much of the outrage over EpiPen’s persistently high prices focuses on the 
product’s role as an emergency medicine in connection with Mylan’s putatively 
anticompetitive conduct.105 These criticisms are important. But an additional 
wrinkle is the connection between patents and the FDA’s role in governing drug-
device combination products. Currently, makers of drug-device combination 
products, like EpiPen, list certain patents covering the drug and device components 
of their product in the Orange Book. This makes sense with respect to the drug 
component of a product. But listing the device patents as well alters the usual 
tradeoff between possible infringement and approval for drugs and devices, 
centering Hatch-Waxman Act patent litigation on the device and its improvements. 
This contributes to high prices for brand combination products, a particularly 
pernicious problem in the context of emergency medicines for which patients may 
face high out-of-pocket costs. 
This is not to say that the device components of combination products are not 
a critically important focus of safety and effectiveness. They are, and EpiPen 
provides, in many ways, a cautionary tale about presuming that complex 
manufacturing for autoinjectors can be easily accomplished for generics. That said, 
refusing to list device patents in the Orange Book is low-hanging fruit106 for drug-
patent reform; the FDA does not otherwise tie the approval of devices to device 
patents. Making such changes in Orange Book practice—especially for 
autoinjectable emergency medicines—would foster generic entry, put downward 
pressure on prices for such products, and broaden patient access. For many drugs, 
the connection between patents and prices is often opaque. But for combination-
product emergency medicines like EpiPen, the connection between patents and 
prices may be the difference between life and death. 
 
 
 105 See sources cited supra note 6. 
 106 Cf. Mello & Riley, supra note 90, at 1 (identifying other “[l]ow-[h]anging [f]ruit” for reining 
in drug prices).  
